RAILROAD CO. r. ItlGGINS.

We regret that. our present correspondent should have felt any
annoyance at what he calls "a fling at the whipping-posts on
Fairfield Common," contained in the article of our former contributor, as if it might be regarded as a reproach to the noblest
of the Old Thirteen-Old Connecticut-that she had not dug up
her whipping-posts sooner, when they all stood for the double
office of" town-posts" as well. We assure that gentleman that
the last thing we should ever think of countenancing, would be
an intentional insult to the state of Connecticut-the bluest and
the best of all the Old Thirteen, in our humble estimation. We
honor and love her most sincerely, with all her faults, and not the
less for her repeal of this statute, and for the reason assigned as
well as the fact. Justice to the accused, and reasonable forbearance in the expedients resorted to for convicting, will always
enable a state the more rigorously and unflinchingly to enforce
the punishment of offenders, after they are convicted.
Our own experience has long ago convinced us, that it is better
to give the accused every reasonable ground to secure a fair and
thorough defence, and then the public will acquiesce more readily
in the infliction of punishment, to the full extent of the law.
Facilities for convictions will prove of little avail, if the hand of
the executioner and of the executive officer, in every department,
is to be paralysed by a maudlin sympathy with the offender the
moment he becomes a convict.
I. F. R.
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HANNIBAL AND ST. JOSEPH RAILROAD CO. v. HATTIE HIGGINS
BY ELIZA HIGGINS, HER GUARDIAN.
Prinid Facie Presumnption of Cause of Injury to Passengers.-The Statute of
Missouri giving a remedy to the representatives of a passenger killed upon a rail
way train, goes upon the same principle which before obtained in regard to injuries
to passengers, that such injury or death primd facie results from want of due care
in the company.
Proof of the Cause of the Injury admissible.-This presumption is not conclusti e
under the statute, but may be rebutted by evidence of the cause of fhe injury.
Distinction between .Employees of tAe Company and Passengers.--One who had
been in the employment of the company as an engineer and brakesman, until his
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train was discontinued, a few days previous, and who had not been settled with or
discharged, although not actually under pay at the time, and who signalled the
train to take him up, and who took his seat in the baggage-car with the other
employees of the company, and paid no fare and was not expected to, although at
the time in pursuit of other employment, cannot be considered a passenger.
If he would secure the immunities and rights of a passenger, he should have paid
fare and taken a seat in the passenger-car.
Effect of Free Passageor Change of Position upon the Rights of Passengers.-It
will not deprive of his remedy a passenger who comes upon the train in that character,
and is so received, that he is allowed, as matter of courtesy, to pass free, or to ride
with the employees of the. road in the baggage-car. But a passenger who leaves the
passenger-carriages to go upon the platforms or into the baggage-cars, unless compelled to do so for want of proper accommodations in the passenger-carriages, or
else by the permission of the conductor of the train, must be regarded as depriving
himself of the ordinary remedies against the company for injuries received, unless
upon proof that his change of position did not conduce to the injury.
APPEAL

from the Hannibal Court of Common Pleas.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
HOLMES, .J.-The plaintiff below, an infant and only child of
Thomas G. Higgins, who was killed while riding in a baggage-car
on the Hannibal and St. Joseph Railroad, on the 16th day of
September 1861, brings this suit; the widow having failed to sue
within six months to recover the q5000 damages which are given
by the second section of the act concerning damages (Rev. Stat.
1855, p. 647), where any passenger shall die from an injury
resulting from or occasioned by any defect or insufficiency in any
railroad.
The petition is evidently framed upon that act, though the
statute is not named or referred to by any express words. It
contains two counts: one founded upon the second section, and
the other upon the third section of the act.
The verdict was for the plaintiff upon the first count, and for
the defendant upon the second count; and the damages were
assessed at $5000. The defendant's motion for a new trial was
overruled. The case came up by appeal, and stands here upon
the first count only.
The clause of the act on which this first count is founded relates
exclusively to passengers, and to the cases of injury and death
occasioned by some defect or insufficiency in the railroad. This
statute makes the mere fact of an injury and death resulting from
a cause of this nature, a privid facie case of negligence and
liability on the part of the defendant, as a presumption of law.
It is not a conclusive presumption, but disputable by proof that
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such defect or insufficiency was not the result of negligence, nor
does it preclude any other defence of a different nature. The
act is to be interpreted and construed with reference to the state
of the law as it stood before its passage. By the general principles of law, which were applicable to common carriers of passengers and to persons standing in that relation, the fact of an injury
to a passenger, occasioned by a defective railroad car or coach
or by a defect in any part of the machinery, makes a primdfacie
case of negligence against the defendant sufficient to shift the
burden of proof; and by that law carriers of passengers were
held responsible for the utmost degree of care and diligence, and
were liable for the slightest neglect. This act is evidently based
upon the same principles: it is confined by its terms strictly to
passengers and to injuries arising from cases of that peculiar
nature only; and it must receive a construction in accordance
with these principles. Viewed in this light, it is clear that the
intent of this clause of the act was to provide greater security
for the lives and safety of passengers as such, and to enable the
representatives of a deceased passenger to pursue the remedy
given by the act; and no other class of persons is intended within
its purview.
The first question here presented, is whether the deceased
person was a passenger within the meaning of the act. The evidence shows ho had been in the employ of the company as an
engineer and brakesman for several years with some intermission;
that for several months previous to the accident and down to the
4th day of September 1861, when his train was stopped by gilerrillas, he had been continually on duty as a brakesman; and that,
about that time, the interruptions occasioned by actual hostilities
in that neighborhood had caused the train on which he was
employed to cease running for a time; and that for several days
before the day of his death he had not been in actual sel vice on
any train, but his name still remained on the roll of the company's
employees as before. He had never been paid off and discharged;
his account was unsettled ; there were arrears still due him at the
time of his decease. It appears brakesmen were paid monthly, but
at the rate of so much per day for as many days as they actually
worked during the month.
These facts would all go to show that his employment still
continued, and that his relation to the company was still that of
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an employee. On the morning of the accident, he signalled the
train to stop and take him up where he was; he took his place on
the baggage-car among other employees; he appears to have
treated himself as an employee, and was treated by the conductor
as an employee who was passing from one point to another on the
road in the usual manner. He engaged no passage, took no seat
in any passenger-car, paid no fare, and evidently did not expect
to pay any: and none was exacted from him. He did not claim
to be a passenger, nor was he treated otherwise than an employee
by the conductor. Upon a careful examination of the evidence
on this point, we think it tended to prove that he was an employee,
and not a passenger within the purview of this act, and that under
all the circumstances the conductor had a right to presume he was
travelling as an employee of the company merely.
Such being the relation of the parties, the mere circumstance
that he had been off duty as a brakesman for some days, or that
he was then passing on his own private errand, and not immediately engaged on the business of the company or in running
that very train, cannot be allowed to make any difference: Cilshannon v. Stony Brook Railroad Co., 10 Cush. 228. The
conductor knowing him only as an employee was not bound to
inquire into his particular errand; and though informed by a
casual conversation with him in the baggage-car, that he was
looking for some temporary employment so as not to lose time:
he still might be justified as treating him as an employee who had
the privilege of free passage on the train as such. Under such
circumstances it was his business, if he claimed to b'e a passenger,
to engage or take a seat in the passenger coach, or at least in
some way to make it known to the conductor that he claimed to
be travelling in the character of a passenger.
Where a director was invited by the president to pass over the
road as a passenger, without paying fare: Philadelphia and
Reading Railroad Co. v. Derby, 14 How. U. S. 468; where a
man was taken up by the engineer of a gravel-train, to be carried
as a passenger, paying fare as the practice had been, and was
allowed to go from the tender to the gravel-car: Lawrenceburg
and Upper MississippiRailroad Co. v. Montgomery, 7 Ind. 474;
and where a maniwho had been a work-hand on the road, but had
left the service of the company two weeks before the accident,
because they did not pay him, got upon the train to be carried as
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a passenger: Oldoi and Mississipi Railroad Co. v. 3iuldins, 30
Ill. 9; and where a house-carpenter was employed to build a
bridge, and was sent by the company on their cars to another
place, to assist in loading timber for the bridge: Gillenwater v.
Madison and Indiana Railroad Co., 5 Ind. 340; the injured
person was held to be clothed with all the right and character of
a passenger and a stranger; and that he was not to be considered
as standing on the same footing as ordinary employees and fellowservants of the company.
If this party had been invited to go in the train as a passenger,
or had taken a seat in a passenger-car, or had been taken on
board the train in the character of a passenger, and the conductor
had merely waived his right to demand fare as an act of liberality
or courtesy, and had then allowed him to pass into the baggagecar to ride there, the case would have been quite different, and
might have fallen within the reasoning and the principles of
these adjudicated cases. The benefit of this act was plainly
intended for those only who stand, strictly speaking, in the relation of passengers, and between whom and the carrier there exists
the privity of contract, with or without fare actually paid, and
the peculiar responsibilities which are implied in that relation and
depend wholly upon it. Where the relation is properly that of
master and servant only, this particular clause of the act has no
application. We think this matter was not fairly nor correctly
laid before the jury by the instructions of the court below.
Again, even if the deceased party would be considered as
having been in any proper sense a passenger, there would not be the
least doubt that he himself neglected all precautions and voluntarily placed himself in a position which he knew to be the most
dangerous on the train for passengers. A baggage-car is certainly
no place for a passenger, and as such the proof shows he had no
business to be there at all. We are aware that it has been held
in some cases, that if a passenger, who is travelling as such, is
allowed to go into the baggage-car, or into a part of the baggage.
car which is used as a post-office, where passengers are sometimes
permitted to be, as in Carrol v. N.ew York and -New Haven
Railroad Co., 1 Duer 571, and while there an accident and injury
occur, by reason of negligence on the part of the company, and
under such circumstances that his being in that place cannot be
said to have materially contributed to produce the accident or

RAILROAD CO. v. HIGGLNS.

injury, the defendant would still be held liable. In many cases
of this kind, it might be difficult to determine whose negligence
had been the real cause of the injury.
But any question of this nature is removed from our consideration in this case, by force of another statute which finds an apt
and just application here.
By the 54th section of the Act concerning Railroad Associations, Rev. Stat. 1855, p. 430, approved one day only after the
act in question, it is expressly provided as follows:"In case any passenger on any railroad shall be injured while
on the platform of a car, or in any baggage, wood, or freight car,
in violation of the printed regulationg of the company, posted up
at the time in a conspicuous place inside of its passenger-cars
then in the train, such company shall not be liable for the injury.
Provided, said company at the time furnished room inside its
passenger-cars sufficidnt for the proper accommodation of its
passengers."
This provision is by the 57th section of the same act made
applicable to all existing railroads in this state: Ibid., p. 438.
Under this section the exemption of the company is made to
depend upon a violation by the passenger of the printed regulations posted up in the passenger-cars only. They are not required
to be posted up in a baggage-car: it is presumed that no passenger will ever be found there. There was evidence in the case
tending to prove that the provision of the statute had been complied with on the part of the defendant; but the printed forms
used had been changed since that time, and no copy of the former
cards had bedn found, and on proof made of the loss of them,
secondary evidence was offered to prove their contents. This
evidence was excluded as irrelevant and having no bearing upon
the case. In the view we have taken of this statute, the evidence
was certainly very material and should have been admitted. It
is true such notice would have given this party no information, for
the reason he did not go in the passenger-car; the evidence tended
to show that he was in fact well acquainted with these regulations;
and this consideration, so far from weighing anything in his favor,
would rather tend to strengthen the inference that he was not a
passenger at all. This statute proceeds again upon the general
principles of law in relation to contributory negligence, and it
supposes that a passenger who has had the warning of this notice,
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and yet has placed himselt in a situation so dangerous as a
baggage-car, is to be considered as contributing by his own negligence to produce the injury, and therefore that the company is
not to be held liable in such cases.
We think that the first and second instructions asked for by
defendant should have been given, and that the fifth, sixth, and
seventh instructions asked for by plaintiff should have beei
refused. It is not deemed necessary more particularly to notice
the other instructions.
The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded.
The other judges concur.
The foregoing opinion seems to us
to present several interesting practical
points, in a very judicious and sensible
light. It is sometimes difficult to determine with exact precision, when a person
ceases to be an employee of the road and
becomes a passenger. There is perhaps
no fairer test than the one presented in
this case, to allow his own claim and
conduct at the time, and the acquiescence
of the company, to determine that question. At the time, one who has recently
been in the employment of the company,
has a motive to claim the privileges of
the employment, by.passing without the
payment of fare. And if he claims the
privilege, and it is acceded to by the
officers of the company, there is great
injustice in allowing the person at the
same time to hold the company up to the
higher kesponsibility which it owes to

passengers, from whom it derives revenue. It should, therefore, be made to
appear, that one who passes in the character of an employee of the road, was
really a passenger, before he can fairly
be allowed to demand the indemnity
which passengers may by law require.
If the person assumes one character for
advantage, and the company accede to
the claim, he ought not to be allowed
the benefits of any other character, unless
it is very clear that such was his real
position, and that this was understood
by the company.
The effect of free passes, and of the
passenger being out of his place in the
carriages, is very fairly presented, as it
seems to us, in the foregoing opinion,
and the principal cases are referred to
I. F. R.
upon all the points.

Supreme Court of Michigan.
THE PEOPLE v. WILLIAM DEAN.
A person having less than one-fourth of black or African blood is a white person
within the meaning of the Constitution of Michigan, and entitled to vote if otherwise qualified.

DEFENDANT was convicted in the court below, upon an indictment for illegal voting, on the ground that he was not a white
VOL. XIV.-46
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man. The testimony established that he had about one-sixteenth
of African blood in his veins.
Williams, Attorney-General, for the People.
Larned &. Hebden, Knight
for defendant.

.

Jennison, and H. .H.C6reever,

The opinion of the court was delivered by
CAMPBELL, J.-Two propositions were discussed on the trial, and
charges were asked or made upon both of them. First,whether a
person of less than one-half of African blood was white within the
meaning of the constitution. Second, whether one of not more than
one-sixteenth African blood was white. The Circuit Judge charged
against the prisoner on both points, and exceptions are taken to his
rulings.
A decision of the second question would probably (so far as we
can judge from the testimony set forth) dispose of this case ; but
as the case is evidently designed to obtain a ruling upon the
general subject, in order to settle the position of persons of mixed
blood under our constitution, it would not be desirable to avoid
the principal question. The constitution now in force gives the
right of voting (under certain restrictions), to "white male" citizens or inhabitants, and certain civilized male inhabitants of Indian
descent. The former constitution confined the privilege to" white
male" citizens or inhabitants. At the time when the present
constitution was submitted to a popular vote, a separate proposition
was submitted with it, whereby if adopted, " every colored male
inhabitant" would have been put upon precisely the same footing,
as an elector, as if he were white. This proposition was rejected,
and the constitution, therefore, admitted none to be electors who
were not "white."
The origin of this regulation, so far as the state of Michigan is
concerned, is to be found in the Act of February 16th 1819,
authorizing the election of a delegate to Congress from Michigan
territory, giving the right of voting to "free white male citizens,"
who had resided here a certain time, and paid taxes. This was
followed by the Act of Congress of March 8d 1823 (amendatory
of the various territorial regulations of Congress), which fixed the
same standard for electors, in all elections for any purpose to be
had within the territory. (L. 1827, p. 84, 85). The first Act
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proposing the erection of a state government, passed June 27th
1832, submitted the question to the votes of the "white male
inhabitants," in their respective districts. (L. 1832, p. 37.)
The Act of September 6th 1834, under which tho census was
taken as a preliminary to applying for admission into the Union,
required the inhabitants to be classed as "1white" or " colored"
persons. (L. 1834, p. 3, 4.) The latter were also divided into
such as were "free" and such as were bound to serve for life or
for a term of years. This was probably to reach such colored
persons as were retained by their former owners within the terms
of Jay's treaty of 1794, under which some cases had been decided
by the Supreme Court of the territory as not subject to the
Ordinance of 1787. The Act of January 26th 1835, under
which the delegates to the convention which framed the first
constitution were elected, provided that the "free white male
inhabitants" of the territory, who should have resided therein
three months previous to the 4th day of April thereafter, should
be authorized to vote for such delegates. (L. 1835, p. 74, 75.)
That constitution was by the convention required to be voted on
by such persons as were thereby qualified" to vote at all elections."
(Schedule Const. 1835, § 9).
We are therefore to determine what was meant by the term
white, when applied to the prevailing portion of the population,
in whose hands the government of this region has been kept
through this course of congressional, territorial, conventional,
and popular action, and from whose numbers the jurors were to
be exclusively drawn, and who alone were, under tle laws of the
United States, subject to be enrolled among the militia. (L.
1827, p. 175; Act of Congress of March 8th 1792, L. 1827, p.
417.)
There was no generally prevalent legal meaning which can be
regarded as having become so attached to the word " white" as to
have been of any governing weight in its adoption. It stands
like any other phrase used in laws and acts of state, which must
be so construed as to carry out the design which its framers may
fairly be supposed to have had in their minds. The reasons for
driwing distinctions in this country between different classes of
inhabitants are notorious; and while the course of events has,
with the destruction of slavery, very considerably modified public
opinion upon questions which bore upon the people formerly
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enslaved, and their kindred, we cannot regard provisions made
under the old state of things as at all changed in their meaning
by any subsequent events. If a popular regulation of to-day
becomes unpopular in its operation to-morrow, no construction can
make it mean to-morrow what it does not mean to-day. The duty
of repealing laws and altering constitutions has not been imposed
upon the judiciary. And I think we cannot truly interpret the
language of our constitution upon the subject of voting, without
giving due consideration to the fact that it sprang from the existence of an extensive and remarkable prejudice, which has been
recognised in all countries as one of the peculiar features of
American society. There are few, if any, states whose statutes
and constitutions have not been tinged by it; and the lines have
been so plainly drawn in the popular mind, that those who have
opposed these regulations and those who have maintained them,
have seldom quarrelled very much over the extent of their application. They have been recognised and treated on all sides as
designed to keep up a dividing line in the law which should prevent the offending of social prejudice. Our state legislation has
never sanctioned the discreditable penal enactments which put
black men in the category of suspected criminals under bonds for
good behavior, as was done in the territory, and we have
never, in state or territory, attempted to make color a test of
veracity in the witness-box. There has been no very serious
difference between the privileges of any of our inhabitants in
matters of mere private concern. But political distinctions have
been perpetuated in the same language, since the origin of our
elective system , in spite of strong efforts to eradicate them. And,
in all this conflict of ideas, it must be borne in mind that it has
never occurred to any one that different shades of color could afford
even a plausible ground of compromise. The mooted principle has been recognised as entirely outside of any shades and gradations of color or blood; and those have only become important
when a practical rule became necessary, to determine who could
be classed as white or not white by any test of reasonably easy
application. For no one has, so far as I know, advanced the
absurd notion that a preponderance of mixed blood, on one side
or the other of any given standard, has the remotest bearing upon
personal fitness or unfitness to possess political privileges. The
subject cannot be discussed on philosophical grounds, because
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there is no philosophical distinction involved. The recognition of
slavery, in all probability, chiefly if not entirely created and confirmed the feeling, which has so jealously separated the white
race, into the privileged and dominant people in this country.
But the right of the people to determine the qualification of
electors is undisputed. We are bound to adhere to the rule which
they have established. The right to vote is granted to a certaindesignated class and to no others. The voter must, without any
undue straining of language in any direction, come within its
terms. I think it has never been deemed improper to solve any
reasonable doubts in his favor; and such is certainly the fair
tendency of our institutions. But to go beyond this, from any
motives of benevolence, or supposed public policy, would be to
create and not to construe the law. The nature of the question
precludes anything like absolute accuracy, because there are no
infallible tests. Opinions may, therefore, very well differ as to
the line which must be adopted, as, on the whole, most likely to
divide electors from non-electors in closest accordance with the
expressed will of the people. And if the term 11white" had no
ascertained and technically accurate legal meaning, when incorporated into the various instruments in which it is found to have
operated in this state, then we must find its interpretation from
the best sources open to us.
The cardinal rule of construction concerning language, is to
apply to it that meaning which it would naturally convey to the
popular mind, in all cases where the propriety of such construction
is not negatived by some settled rule of law. In all instruments
which are submitted for confirmation to the people themselves, and
which derive all their validity from a popular vote, such a construction is peculiarly necessary; for otherwise they would be
defrauded of their right to frame their own government according
to their own will.
When the people of Michigan decided to retain their ancient
system, and to allow none but white persons to vote, they must
have intended to embrace only such as were commonly so-called
and received. Was a person in whom white blood simply predominated over negro blood thus regarded? There may have
been persons, and possibly even communities, who imagined there
was some rule of law which gave to those in that condition the
electoral rights of white persons; and there may have been others
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with -whom social prejudices did not seriously affect their intercourse ; yet, even among these, it cannot be maintained that they
would have been esteemed white. And it has never been the case
that any one having visible tokens of African descent has been
regarded by the community generally as a white person. And
where those tokens have been very slight, yet still perceptible to
ordinary persons, they have caused their possessor to be distinctly
classed among colored persons. I think the mere intensity or
weakness of these signs, when unmistakeable, has made no difference in the classification. And it is very well known that the
associations of persons having visible portions of African blood,
have generally been closer with each other than with those
acknowledged as whites. They consider themselves as of one
race, and live and act together. This mutual recognition, coupled
as it undoubtedly is with a general disposition on the part of
white persons to avoid social relations with the mass of mixed, as
well as unmixed, races of African descent, furnishes a commentary
on the terms wldte and colored, which can hardly be resisted. I
think a conclusion which would convict all persons married in
this state of living in open adultery, where husband and wife are
on different sides of the mulatto standard, would shock the sense
of the whole community, as contrary to all practice and understanding of the received division of races. If this rule has been
misunderstood, such results of course cannot change it; but where
language is used by the people for their own government, the
recognised meaning cannot be ignored without leading to inevitable
mischief.
We are not'left, however, to any individual opinions concerning
the incorrectness of classifying those of visibly-mixed blood among
whites. There are many decisions upon the subject, made in
different parts of the United States, and there have been many
statutes passed, intended to furnish accurate means of determining
the dividing line between the races. And in all of these (except
a class of decisions in Ohio) it is evident that it has not been
deemed proper to class as white any not of pure blood, who could
be distinguished without introducing uncertain tests. There is
neither decision nor statute which places the criterion in the mere
preponderance of either blood. And as the Ohio decisions stand
alone, and have now been distinctly repudiated on principle by
the courts of that state, and only adhered to in a single instance
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where they had determined a rule of right, it may be well to refer
to them. The first case was Gray v. The State, 4 Ohio 354.
where a defendant upon trial objected to the testimony of a negro
offered against him, as incompetent under the statute forbidding
negroes or mulattoes to testify against white persons. The
defend ant was assumed to be of less than half negro blood, and
was held on that account to be a white person. The decision is
very brief, and bears every evidence of haste. The court declare
in substance that the statute in question undertakes to divide the
population of the state into white, black, and mulatto, and that
they are unable to point out any obvious distinction with certainty.
They conclude by declaring that they were governed by two
reasons in making the decision ; 1st. Because unwilling to extend
the disabilities of the statutes; and 2d. Because of the difficulty
of distinguishing among the several degrees of duskiness. It is
somewhat singular, however, that the case itself exemplifies the
fallacy of both of these positions. A penal statute applying in
terms to none but blacks and mulattoes, could not under any circumstances include any others ; and the defendant could not have
been made out to be either a black or a mulatto, by holding that
he was not a white man. And, so far as relates to facility of distinction, the court in this case founded its judgment upon a finding
of a judicial inspection of the party without any testimony whatever, and on the faith of such inspection was enabled to say that
he was of mixed blood, somewhat more white than black, showing
an ability to distinguish him readily from the white race by his
appearance, and acting upon a test of color which it at the same
time professed to repudiate. The next case was Williams v. School
District .Ah. 6, Wright's (Ohio) Rep. 578, where a person threequarters white, and taxed for schools, complained of the exclusion
from schools of his children by a white wife. The law in express
terms exempted none but negroes and mulattoes from school
taxes, and then required all white children to be received. The
court, while holding that his suit was too defective to be maintained, and therefore putting him out of court, asserted the
authority of the former decision, and were severe upon the district
for taking his money and yet refusing to receive his children.
They, however, would have been treated as white by good authorities elsewhere. In T"ffries v. Ankeny, 11 Ohio 372, where a
person of one-fourth Indian and three-fourths white blood claimed
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the right to vote, the court saw fit for the first time to resort to
the general rule concerning the condition of such persons as
derived from public opinion, and declared them white: and from
the peculiar manner in which Gray's Case is referred to and
quoted, and the care with which they abstain from referring
expressly to any similar rule as applying to Indian blood, it is
evident that thev felt a little awkward in classing blacks and
Indians together, and that they had been very careless in their
previous language. They had found no such public opinion to
aid them concerning mixed African blood, and it is too well
known to require argument-and the facts stated in the decision
show it-that Indian blood was never considered in that state (as
it was not considered here) any detriment whatever to social
consideration ; and even half-breeds as well as quarter-breeds are
by no means uncommonly reckoned among the whites, and are
often quite undistinguishable from them in appearance and
language.
7'hlacker v. Hfawkc, 11 Ohio 376, was a case where the court
below held that any mixture of African blood whatever disqualified a person from voting (a doctrine which prevails nowhere);
and the judgment was reversed on the authority of Gray's Case.
There are also some other decisions resting on the same authority,
but throwing no further light on the subject.
The old Constitution of Ohio having received this settled construction, a new one was adopted, retaining the same provision
as to color; and it was held in Anderson v. Iffilliken, 9 Ohio
State R. 568, that it must be considered as having been adopted
subject to the'construction expressly given to it upon that head,
and that voters need only have a predominance of white blood,
because that had been fixed by the re-adoption of a construed
clause. But the same bench, at the previous term, in Van Camp
v. Board of Edccation of Logan, 9 Ohio State R. 406, held that
the rule was not maintainable on any other ground, and refused
to follow the old decisions any further. They held that colored
persons, whether lighter or darker than mulattoes, had never been
received or regarded as white by public sentiment, and should
not be so held; and that the old decisions had never been able
to satisfy the community, or to prevent the Legislature from considering the standard erroneous; and that they were evidently
the result of a vry natural feeling, that some of the laws were
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discreditable and unjust. The very fact that it became necessary
for the appellate court to repeat the same decisions so many
times, is strong evidence that they were not acquiesced in as well
founded ; and shows the folly of attempting to assert, by judicial
authority, that words mean what everybody knows they do not
mean. It has, indeed, been considered a proper exercise of judicial courtesy to strain a point in favor of statutes, so as to give
them a meaning which shall save their constitutionality; but with
that somewhat questionable exception, courts will always find it
necessary to explain away fewer of their own words, when they
fix a natural meaning upon the words of others, and leave the
responsibility of every measure to fall where it belongs.
As the decisions now stand, so far as I have been able to follow
them out, there is not a court in the United States which holds
that a " colored person," in the popular acceptation, although
lighter than a mulatto, can be called white, without doing violence
to language. In this state, both before and since the constitution now under consideration, the population of African descent
has always been divided into black, 9ulatto, and "1 otherpersons
of color," under statutes designed to protect them from illegal
bondage ; and every one must admit that statutes which protected
none of a lighter shade than mulatto would have been of comparatively small service in that direction. See R. S. 1838, p.
624; 2 Comp. laws, § 5735; Laws 1859, p. 526. The term
"cpersonsof color" was used in a very broad sense, and in con
f6rmity with popular usage, or it was senseless altogether.
If a man is not made white by a mere predominance of white
blood, then the question arises, where is the line to be drawn, and
how is the distinction to be ascertained ? Rules of suffrage must
be presumed uniform as far as possible. It must be admitted,
therefore, that we are compelled to discover some mode .of classification, and that persons of precisely the same blood must be
treated alike, although they may differ in their complexions.
There are white men as dark as mulattoes, and there are pureblooded Albino Africans as white as the whitest Saxons. This
classification is no doubt a difficult task, and there is room for
much disagreement in it, because no rule can be applied without
some inconvenience; but that will not justify us, I think, in
refusing to assume the duty, and in holding those to be white who
can be easily seen by every one to be otherwise. We are not,
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however, without some excellent guides upon the subject, in the
constitution and the laws which have governed our elections from
the outset.
The constitution does not impose any restriction of color,
except upon electors. The aim of all election laws is to preservo the purity of elections by prevention of illegal voting as
far as possible, so as to insure a legM election as nearly as may
be. The prevention of illegal voting has always been mainly in
the hands of inspectors of election, the registry system having
been adopted long since the last constitution. During a large
portion of the time these inspectors have had no right to examine
one claiming to be a qualified voter on oath, except as to certain facts entirely independent of his color ; and under the statutes
it would have been impossible for them to administer oaths to
witnesses. And it is apparent that if issues could be raised
before them, and tried by witnesses, the trial of the first voter's
qualifications might exhaust the time for the entire poll, and
destroy the election. We held in People v. Wattles, 13 Mich.
446, that the statute requiring a person who would take a certain
oath, to be allowed to vote, did not dispense with the prerequisite
of registration; and the former Supreme Oiurt, in Gordon v.
Farrar,2 Doug. Mich. 411, held under a similar statute, entitling
a person to vote who took an oath,' having no reference to his
color, that the inspectors must in some way or other be satisfied
that he was white. As they could generally do this only by
inspection (not being able to obtain testimony), we must assume
that it"was intended that the division of persons into white and
other than white must be designed to reach those who, as classes,
are apparently white, and likely to be so regarded by.men generally. No scientific or technical test could be admissible, because
the inspectors must usually be plain men of miscellaneous occupations. In some states the rule of determining blood by appearance has been held applicable to individual cases, without classification; and in Johnson v. Norwich, 29 Conn. 407, this rule is
referred to as having much to recommend it. The Supreme Court
of Ohio, in Gray's Case, acted upon' a similar principle of judging of blood by appearances. But it seems necessary, in order
to make the constitutional rule at all suitable and practicable, that
any general classification must be based upon the distinction
between those who as classes are apparently white and those who
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are not. As all really legal voters should have their rights, the
line must be so drawn as to include among the white all classes
except those among whom persons apparently white arc exceptional cases. And it remains to be seen whether any such division
is feasible.
It will be found, by inspection of vocabularies and books of
reference, that among all the principal civilized nations which
have had to deal with the African race, there have been but three
well-recognised divisions of pure and mixed blood, into blacks,
mulattoes, and quadroons. None of these can be properly classified as white. Beyond this the division ceases to be general.
The term " Octoroon," in the English, except possibly as a scientific term, belongs to the department of sensational literature,
and has not, until very recently, been adopted into any of the
dictionaries. It does not appear in such works generally. It is
fair to presume-and I think such is the general experiencethat while quadroons are in most cases easily distinguished as not
white, persons having less than one-fourth African blood are often
enough white in appearance to render any further classing difficult, and to require, in many instances, more than the usual
knowledge of mankind to distinguish their mixed blood by inspection. The Virginia rule of presumptions, adopted in the last
century, when opinions had not become heated on this subject,
fixed the line of quarter-blood as the dividing standard: Dean
v. Commonwealth, 4 Grattan 541; Gentry v. MfelJfanus, 3 Dana
382. Judge BOUVIER recognises this as a prevalent rule: 1 Bouvier's Institutes 70. It is a rule less likely to cause litigation or
mistake than any other, and one which does no violence to the
general understanding, by including among whites any great
number of evidently colored persons, while it is broad enough to
admit all who have any reasonable claim to be called white. I
am of opinion that it should be considered, therefore, that persons are white within the meaning of our constitution, in whom
white blood so far preponderates that they have less than onefourth of African blood ; and that no other persons of African
descent. can be so regarded. As the defendant comes very far
within this rule, I think a new trial should be granted.
OHRISTIANCY and COOLEY, JJT., concurred. NARTIN, 0. J., agreed
in granting a new trial, but dissented from the rule establishing
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the test of one-fourth African blood, and expressed his opinion
that the true test was a simple preponderance of white or blacic
blood.
The question discussed and decided in
the foregoing case will attract the attention of the profession, as upon a point
about which, as is observed in the opinion, the friends and the opponents of
the regulations excluding persons of
African descent from political privileges,
have had little occasion to dispute. With
the profoundest sympathy, however, in
the movements which have commenced
the political emancipation of a longoppressed race, and the highest respect
for the court, we cannot avoid saying
that the argument of the court leads with
singular directness away from its conclusion. The general rule of interpretation
of the Constitution, that words which
had not at the time of their adoption any
fixed legal meaning, shall be understood
in the ordinary or popular sense, is laid
down with great force and clearness, and
the fact is fairly admitted that persons in
whom a tinge of African blood is apparent to ordinary observation, are not
classed by popular estimation among
whites. To us, the inevitable conclusion
from this is, that no person in whom
any trace of African blood is perceptible,
or is known to exist, is within the legal
class of white citizens who are entitled
to vote. No doubt such a rule is unfair
and illiberal; but the necessity of any
rule at all on the subject, is the result of
prejudice and illiberality, and harsh as
it tnay be, we can see no other conclusion from the premises. The remedy for
such case is not with the courts, but
with the law-making power.
The standard, moreover, which the

court set up in the principal case is
entirely arbitrary, and however convenient, it seems to us, with great deference to the court, to be established by a
very clear act of judicial legislation.
As a matter of fact, it is very doubtful
whether a large majority of persons with
one-eighth of African blood would not be
instantly recognised as "colored" in
any part of the United States, and it
would probably be impossible to fix any
definite proportion of mixed blood as a
standard, without frequently including
persons unquestionably colored, or excluding those who might generally pass
for white. Brothers and sisters, children
of black and white or black and mulatto
parents, frequently differ strikingly in
their shades of color, and it is not very
unusual for children of mulattoes to be
darker than either parent. In Johnson
v. Norwich, 29 Conn. Rep. 407, the
Supreme Court of Connecticut distinctly
declined to introduce any arbitrary and
artificial test depending on the proportion of mixed bloods, and held that those
are black, or at least colored, who are
proved to be of African descent, and
who also have and disclose visibly the
peculiar and distinctive color of the
African race. The question is thus left
to be settled as one of fact in each individual case, and notwithstanding the
convenience for some purposes of the
rule established by the principal case,
we cannot but think the other the sounder
and more consistent decision.
J. T. M.
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Superior Court of Cincinnati.
OHIO AND MISSISSIPPI RAILROAD CO. v. INDIANAPOLIS AND
CINCINNATI RAILROAD CO.
A receiver appointed by the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern
District of Ohio, to take possession of a railroad and its effects, may sue in this
court, upon a contract made by that corporation in the corporate name of the
railroad, without disclosing in the petition his own name as receiver.
A foreign corporation, having no charter from the state of Ohio, authorizing it
to construct and operate a railroad in this state, cannot, by a transfer of a portion
of a railroad already constructed in the state by legal authority, acquire a right to
use and operate such railroad within this state.
The plaintiffs, being authorized to construct and operate a railroad from Cincinnati to Vincennes, and the defendants, being authorized to construct and operate a
railroad from Indianapolis to Lawrenceburg, of a different gauge, entered into a
contract whereby the defendants, in consideration of being allowed to lay a third
rail on the road of the plaintiffs from Lawrenceburg to Cincinnati, and of the
agreement of the plaintiffs to furnish motive power for hauling the cars of the
defendants on that part of the road, agreed, among other things, to'lend to the
plaintiffs $30,000, for the purpose of erecting a depot for the plaintiffs in Cincinnati ; to erect a depot at a cost of $15,000, on lands of the plaintiffs in Cincinnati,
to become the property of the plaintiffs at the expiration of the contract; to form
no connections at or beyond Lawrenceburg prejudicial to the plaintiffs ; and to give
the plaintiffs exclusive control of the employees of the defendants while on the
road of the plaintiffs. Held, on the construction of the charters of the plaintiffs
and defendants, that such contract was beyond the competency of the contracting
parties and was void.
The contract als6, provided that the defendants should have the use of a depot
and certain grounds in Cincinnati, for unloading goods and lumber, for thirty
years. Held, that this created an easement in the land, and was, in connection
with the laying and keeping up the third rail, in substance a lease, which the
plaintiffs had no authority to make, and that it being for more than three years,
was also invalid under the Statute of Frauds, for the want of legal acknowledgment. Held, also, that the defendants having as a foreign corporation no right to
accept a lease of a railroad in Ohio, the plaintiffs could not have had a specific
performance of the agreement, the remedies of the parties not being mutual.

T.

C. Mitc) ell, C. -).

Coffin, and TW.

X. Evarts, for the

plaintiffs.
H. E. Curwen, Thomas A. Hfendricks, George B. -Pugh,and
V. Worthington, for the defendants.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
STORER, J.-A preliminary question is raised, which directly
involves the right of the plaintiffs to maintain this action. It is

admitted by the pleadings, that certain proceedings have been
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had in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern
District of Ohio, wherein the creditors of the plaintiffs filed their
bill in equity, and a receiver was appointed to take possession of
all the property of the plaintiffs, subject to the order of the
court; that possession -was accordingly taken, and is now held by
the receiver under his appointment. It is alleged, "that this
action is not prosecuted by the receiver, nor by order of the court
or any of the judges thereof."
We suppose, as it is distinctly averred in the replication, that
the order of the court was in fact made authorizing this action to
be brought; we need only consider the point in whose name it
should be prosecuted.
As the objection, if properly taken, may be readily obviated by
the proper amendment under our code of practice, it is in reality
but a very formal one; but we are satisfied the plaintiffs were the
proper parties to institute this litigation, and in no aspect in which
the case appears to us need the receiver to .have been joined as a
party defendant. If there should be a recovery by the plaintiffs,
it will be by their corporate name, and the receiver, upon proper
application to this court, would be allowed to control the process
and collect the amount due, to carry out more fully the purposes
of his appointment. But we can find no case in practice where a
receiver, not specially authorized to do so by statute, has ever
been permitted to bring an action in his own name, either to
recover possession of property or to reduce a chose in action to
judgment.
Before such an officer can bring or even defend an ejectment,
he must have -obtained the leave of court to do so, for he was but
their servant, subject to their control, and deriving all his power
from the tribunals who appointed him: 2 Maddox Ch. 243;
Jeremy's Eq. 252; 2 Story'g Eq. Jur., § 833.
Hence, when it became necessary for the receiver to sue, the
name of the original party in interest was always used: Green
v. Winter, 1 Johns. Ch. Rep. 61; Pdrker v. Browning, 8
Paige 388.
Chief Justice SHARKEY, in Freeman v.Tinchester, 10 Smedes
& Marshall 580, says: "No case can be found in which a receiver
has been permitted to sue, except at law, in an action of ejectment, on leave first granted for that purpose. He is but an
officer of the court appointed to hold a fund pending litigation or
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infancy. If he can sue at all it must be in the name of the party
having the legal right; the authority to sue does not convert that
which was before purely legal into an equitable right."
The result is, the order appointing the receiver does not change
the character of the parties to the contract; it gives merely the
power to protect the interests of all parties in the property, or
fund in controversy. We are satisfied, therefore, the plaintiffs
are the proper parties to prosecute the suit before us.
There is in reality but one question we are asked to decidecould the parties, plaintiffs or defendants, in virtue of their
several corporate powers, bind each other by the contract made
by their agents on the 2d day of October 1856 ?
The plaintiffs were incorporated by the Legislature of Indiana
to construct a railroad from Vincennes to Lawrenceburg, in that
state, and afterward, by a statute of this state, the- corporate
body created by the state of Indiana was authorized to lay out
and construct a railroad from Lawrenceburg to Cincinnati, with
the same powers conferred on railroad companies by the laws of
Ohio; and by an amended act the plaintiffs were recognised as a
corporation then existing.
Whether the legislative action of Ohio created defacto a new
corporation or not, or whether under the power thus conferred a
corporation has ever been organized, is not a question now to be
considered. We may assume, however, that permission was
thereby granted to the plaintiffs to extend their road to Cincinnati
upon the same conditions, and with the same restrictions pertaining to other corporations of a similar kind, then in existence
within this state; and for all practical purposes, the plaintiffs,
who claim its benefits, must be regarded as another corporation,
distinct from and independent of the body incorporated by the
state of Indiana.
We are met, then, at the threshold of the case, with the question: Had the plaintiffs, at the time the contract of October 2d
1856 was entered into, any corporate power to lease their road,
in whole or in part, to a foreign corporation ?
It is very certain the defendants had no authority, as an
Indiana corporation, to operate their road from Lawrenceburg to
Cincinnati. They could not have appropriated the right of way,
for they possessed no franchise that would impart any right of
eminent domain. If, then, they could not directly claim the
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privileges of an Ohio corporation, the same being opposed to the
sovereignty of the state, can it be said they could effect the same
object by the transfer to them of a portion of the plaintiffs' road,
which must necessarily attach to it, if permitted at all, the
protection of their franchise also ?
The plaintiffs were authorized to construct a railway to be used
solely by them, for their own purposes, subject to the supervision
of the state by subsequent legislation; and for all oumissions of
corporate duty or commissions of wrong to the writ of quo warranto, and such other process as the court might deem proper to
control corporate action. Hence, it must follow, the immunity
conferred was exclusively for their benefit; it could not be
impartea to others, for the necessary result would be, if one foreign corporation might purchase the right to use the railway, the
same privilege may be granted to as many more as the road could
accommodate; the lessees in the meanwhile not being responsible
to the state or amenable to its process. If such an arrangement
was made, there would be no mutuality between the parties, as
the foreign corporation could not be held to comply with its conditions, nor yet compel the plaintiffs to perform them on their
part; for it must be granted the foreign corporation is confined to
the corporate powers granted by the state which creates it, and
can claim nothing more: Bank of Augusta v. -Earle,13 Peters
589 ; Ohio and MississippiRailroad v. Wheeler, 1 Black 29.
The law applicable to this class of corporations is very clearly
stated by Mr. -Hodges, in his work on Railways, p. 63: "The
great principle which governs all those cases is this, that a railway company is a corporation established for a particular purpose,
and the directors have no power to bind the corporation by entering into contracts for purposes foreign to those for which the
corporation was established ; such contracts are ultra vires and
illegal."
By the statute 8 & 9 Vict. ch. 20, § 87, special permission is
given to one company to contract with another company for the
right of passage over their track; and if, without legislative
authority, an agreement is made transferring the power of one
company to the other, equity will noi lend its aid to carry it into
effect: Great Northern Bailway Company v. -EasternOountie8
Railway, 9 Hare 306.
So, in Winch v. Birkenhead, Lancashire and Chester Bail-
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way, 13 E. L. & Eq. 516, several companies had agreed to run
over the track of the Birkenhead Road until an Act of Par]iament
could be obtained authorizing a lease. It was held the contract
was not within the power of the companies to make. The *ame
point had been before decided in East Anglian Railway v.
-Eastern Counties Railway, 7 E. L. & Eq. 506: Redfield on
Railways, ch. 24, § 1, p. 418; Pierce on Railroads 395, 397.
We do not find the courts in the United States have varied the
rule, as in every case we have examined legislative leave had
been given before the lease was made: 17 Barbour 601, 602; 6
Cushing 384; Redfield on Railways 418.
What then is the legal effect of the contract between the
parties ? It is to secure to the defendants the use of the plaintiffs' roadway for thirty years, on certain conditions, which are
the equivalent for what otherwise would be denominated an
annual rental:
First.-The defendants are permitted to lay down, at their
own expense, upon the plaintiffs' structure, an additional rail, to
remain there subject to all appropriate repairs by the defendants,
to be used by them for the entire term.
Second.-The cars of the defendants are to be run over the
road, and it is admitted have been drawn by the defendants' locomotives, under charge of their conductors, and with certain deductions, at their expense, the right to do so being co-extensive
with the term already stated.
If the plaintiffs had merely engaged to be carriers of all the
freight and passengers brought by the defendants to Lawrenceburg, from thence to Cincinnati, and receive therefor a fair equivalent, there would be no difficulty in giving such a construction
to the agreement as would create a personal obligation only
between the parties; but in order to give it this effect, and secure
to the defendants its full benefit, they must not only enjoy, but
be protected in the enjoyment of what is in reality the easement
growing out of, and dependent upon, the occupation of the plaintiffs' railway, for the entire period of the contract, uncontrolled
by the plaintiffs so long as the conditions the defendants were
bound to perform are properly fulfilled. If the plaintiffs are not
bound to permit the defendants to use their road, the defendants
cannot be required to perform their part of the agreement; and
VOL.
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if they do, the right to occupy is connected directly with the
realty, and is in effect a lease of the railway.
But the privilege intended to be imparted does not stop with
the use of the railway and its various attachments, for the period
referred to, but it secures to the defendants the right to occupy
sufficient ground on the premises of the plaintiffs in Cincinnati,
upon which the defendants are to erect a freight depot, with the
additional use of another portion, where the defendants can place
their lumber, besides the occupation in common with the plaintiffs
of their general passenger depot, and all these are to continue
during the existence of the agreement.
In 9 Hare 312, it was held, by Vice-Chancellor TURNLR, that
an agreement by one railroad to give to another the power to run
over its road for a time, dependent upon certain conditions,
although it was declared it should not operate as a lease, or an
agreement for a lease, "1it was, nevertheless, in substance, either
the one or the other." So in Winch v. The Birkenhead, Lancashire, and Chester Junction Railway Co., 5 De Gex &
Smale 562, it was said by Vice-Chancellor PARKER that an agreement, similar in its terms, was in the nature of a lease; and the
same point was determined in Clay v. Bufford, Id. 769, and
again in Beman v. Rufford, 1 Simon N. S. 550, by Lord
CRANWORTH.

Chancellor WALWORTH, in Pitkin v. The Long Island Bailroad Co., 2 Barbour, Chancery Reports 222, held that an
agreement made by a railroad company with the owner of land
adjoining the railroad, " to establish and maintain a permanent
turnout track and stopping-place at a particular point in the
neighborhood of his property, and to stop there with .the freight
trains and passenger cars of the company," was, in substance,
the grant of an easement or servitude, and required the proper
instrument to be executed to take the agreement without the
Statute of Frauds. This case was afterwards fully approved,
and the principle sustained in Day v. New York Central Railroad Co., 31 Barbour 554.
We are satisfied, therefore, from a careful examination of the
contract between these parties, that it was an agreement for a
lease to continue for thirty years; that the privilege granted
was, in law, an easement for the whole period, and not a mere
license to enter upon and use the plaintiffs' road, determinable at
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their option. That no power was given by the state of Ohio to
the plaintiffs to lease their road, or transfer, in whole or in part,
their franchise; and it necessarily follows that no right was
conferred upon the defendants, the agreement claimed to have
imparted it being simply void.
We are equally satisfied that the defendants had no authority
to enter into this agreement; none can fairly be inferred from
the various statutes of Indiana conferring corporate power, and
none ought to be implied, except upon very clear expressions of
legislative intention. Although there are cases when directors
of such a company as this may have imperfectly performed their
duties in relation to a subject within their corporate ability, yet,
if the stockholders have been benefited, and, moreover, permitted
the act to pass without objection, they will not, and ought not to
be allowed to question the mode in which the act was done. If
the charter, for instance, required the corporate seal to be
attached to the agreement, and yet a contract by parol has been
executed, the matter of which was clearly within the corporate
power, the rule adopted in Bank of Columbia v. Patterson, 7
Cranch 297, may well apply. It is, then, but simple justice,
and no legal principle is really violated. But where a body of
individuals is vested by law with power only to engage in a
special business, any attempt on the part of such a corporation
to change the .object of their association, or undertake new and
distinct pursuits from those described in their organic law, such
assumptions are ipso facto illegal, and whenever brought to the
notice of the courts by third persons, or the parties themselves
to the contract, will not be sustained. In such cases there is no
estoppel, for there is no legal competency in the contracting
parties; and the affirmance, or disaffirmance, of their acts, by
matter in Pais, or by corporate resolutions, can give no validity
to that which never legally existed. If a corporation could be
estopped from setting up its want of authority to enter into
contracts made by its agents, its power might be indefinitely
enlarged, and what it was not permitted to do by its charter
would become obligatory by its acquiescence. In. other words,
the effect of such a rule would be to authorize corporate officers
to supply all deficiencies in power already granted, with ability
to add new powers as the occasion might require, and thus save
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the necessity of asking legislative aid to amend or modify their
charter.
The principle we have thus indicated is so well established,
that to sustain it would seem to require no quotation of authorities.
It results from the very nature of the relations corporate bodies
sustain to the power that creates them, and is nothing more than
the same rule we are bound to apply to individuals. When their
contracts are against law, or public policy, or good morals, they
cannot be sustained on the ground of estoppel, admission, or
acquiescence; but whenever such contracts are sought to be
enforced, if it is manifest by the pleadings, or in the evidence,
that such or similar infirmities exist, there is but one course for
us to pursue, " in yari delicto melior est con ditio defendentis :"
Coleman v. Eastern Counties Railway Co., 10 Beavan 1 ; Macgregor v. Deal and Dover Railway Co., 16 Eng. L. & Eq. 180;
West London Railway Co. v. London and North-Western
Railway Co., 18 Id. 468; Mayor of Norwich v. Norfolk Railway Co., 30 Id. 120 ; Shrewsbury and Birmingham Railway
Co. v. North-Western Railway Co. and Shropshire Union
Railways and Canal Co., 6 House of Lords Cases 138; Earnest
v. Nicholls, Id. 408 ; Harrisonv. Great Northern Railway Co.,
11 Common Bench 815; Straus v. Eagle Insurance Co., 5 Ohio
St. 59; Marietta Railroad v. -Elliot,10 Id. 61; Atkinson v.
Marietta Railroad Co., 15 Id. 23; Dodge v. Worley, 18 How.
381; Pearce v. X. and L Railroad, 21 Id. 443; 0. M. Railroad v. Wheeler, 1 Black 29.
These cases, when carefully considered, not only decide that
the corporation itself cannot claim relief when the agreement it
has entered into is beyond its delegated powers, but.establishes
without reservation the rule that, like natural persons, it must
place its right to recover upon the power conferred by its charter.
Whenever it transcends it, and by no just construction the
authority claimed can be found in the organic law, the corporate
body is practically without a charter, and is but a voluntary
association of individuals.
Let us now inquire to what extent the agreement between
these parties was obligatory on the defendants. The defendants
are an Indiana corporation. We have examined the act incorporating them, and its several amendments, and find no special
powers granted to the corporators that are not common to such
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companies generally. If, then, we apply the principles we have
already stated to the contract made by the defendants, we
must hold:
1. That the Indianapolis and Cincinnati Railroad Company
had no power to operate a road east of Lawrenceburg to Cincinnati; and having no corporate power from the state of Ohio to
construct a new railway, or to enter her jurisdiction as a foreign
corporation, it could not use a railway already established
between these termini, or contract to pay a stipulated sum for
the privilege.
2. The defendants had no power to loan $30,000 to a foreign
corporation for the purpose of erecting a passenger depot without
the state from which they derive their charter.
3. That the defendants had no power to stipulate with the
plaintiffs that they would erect a freight depot, at a cost of
$15,000, in Cincinnati, to become the property of the plaintiffs
when the agreement should expire.
4. That it had no power to permit the plaintiffs to use the cars
of the Indianapolis Company without compensation, a privilege
not contemplated in its charter.
5. That it had no power to give the exclusive control over its
employees and agents to the plaintiffs.
6. That it had no power to agree that, for thirty years, it
would form no lew connection at or beyond Lawrenceburg, or to
discriminate in the tariff of prices in favor of Lawrenceburg as
against Cincinnati.
There are other stipulations, which, in their spirit, must be
included in the result to which we have airived, but we need not
specially refer to them.
Any of these conditions, if not yet performed, we believe a
court of equity, on the application of a stockholder, would
have restrained the defendants from carrying into effect, as each
one of them was beyond the power of the corporation to make;
and the assent, even, of the stockholders at the time, or their subsequent acquiescence, could not change the principle. We have
already said, if the authority does not exist independent of the
assent of the stockholders, their concurrence does not confer it.
This doctrine is well discussed and determined in East Anglian
Railway v. -astern Counties Railway, 11 Common Bench 815,
which has an important application to the general power of rail-
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way corporations and is a practical resum6 of' the previous cases
upon the subject, both at law and in equity, decided in the Eng.
lish courts. See, also, Coleman v. .Eastern Counties Railway,
4 Railway Cases 882.
The several grounds we have stated, upon which we hold the
agreement between these parties was beyond their corporate
power, are so palpable that the propositions, when once fairly
expressed, need no argument to sustain them. It is but the
assumption of unauthorized power that could claim to expend
corporate funds, without the territory where the road is located,
for an object disconnected with the purpose for which the body
was organized, and never within the original contemplation of the
stockholders; building warehouses and leasing depots in Ohio,
surrendering all control over the rolling stock of the company,
substituting the agents and employees of another company for
their own, while willingly incurring all liability for their negligence in managing and conducting the trains that pass over a foreign railway, contracting to advance a large sum for the erection
of a passenger depot, restraining the corporation and those who
may manage it, for thirty years, not to make new connections or
avail itself of another route, however convenient or eligible, binding itself for the same period not to determine the price of freight
or the fare of passengers without consulting with and having the
consent of the plaintiffs, nor yet to extend the road then in existence,
to the west of Indianapolis, or in any direction that should be
prejudicial to the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad Company.
When these conditions stand out in the agreement itself with so
much prominbnce, and must be performed, else the defendants
have no right reserved to them, it would seem no ground was left
upon which we could justly sustain the plaintiffs' claim to recover.
And in thus holding we but affirm the ruling in The Shrewsbury and Birmingham Bailroad Company v. London, &c., 4 De
G. & M cNaughton, 120; 6 House of Lords Cases 138; 1 De G.
& McN. 732; Stuart v. London and North Western Rail
way Company.
We are satisfied, also, the contract referred to is inoperative,
because there is no mutuality in its provisions. The defendants
could not have enforced it by legal means, if the plaintiffs should
have declined to perform their covenants; for no chancellor, we
believe, would lend his aid to give existence to that which was
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void by its very terms, not only as assuming to be obligatory on
the parties, when it is clearly beyond corporate power, but
opposed to sound policy-a party claiming to enter as a foreign
corporation, and to enjoy the privileges of a legal organization,
without the consent of state authority.
It has been suggested in the argument, that the defendants, in
availing themselves of their legal right of defence, are obnoxious
to just censure ; but with the motives of parties we do not interfere when called on to administer the law. Questions of taste
may be left to the casuist. In the examination of the case before
us, we think, if a retort were permitted, the plaintiffs and defendants occupy a common ground. They can only settle what is the
true standard of courtesy.
We find a contract submitted to us which, if both parties had
asked us to enforce, the law, as we understand it, would forbid us
to adjudicate upon, except to leave those who had obligated themselves to their own moral sense. We could not have added by
our decree new powers, or given vitality to that which never had
legal life.
On the hypothesis, even, that the parties may have had the
corporate power to contract, we cannot aid the plaintiffs, for we
could not, if the action was reversed, have aided the defendants.
On the ground we have assumed, the agreement is for a lease to
continue thirty.years. It is not a lease executed, because the
forms of the statute requiring acknowledgment and record have
not been complied with, and part performance cannot avail in the
position the parties are now placed in. The case of Bichiardsonv.
Bates, 8 0. N. S. 257, is decisive of the question. As the defendants could not, if compelled to leave the plaintiffs' railway, have
been aiided by a court of law in being reinstated in the enjoyment
of the easement, so neither can the plaintiffs maintain an action
for revt, if the defendants have left the premises, when there was
no contract subsisting which would have legally required them to
remain. It is the simple case of a tenant for more than three
years, who is under a parol lease; his term is limited by the
statute, and, when it expired, the contract is at an end.
There is a class of cases where a contract is divisible, and some
of its conditions are legal and some illegal. If the covenants can
be separated, those which are valid may be upheld, and those That
are not, rejected. But this is not such a case. The whole con-
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sideration moving to the defendants is, in effect, the right to use
and occupy the plaintiffs' railway, and the stipulations to be performed as an equivalent by the defendants cannot be enforced,
unless the easement granted is legally secured, and the power to
grant it was given by the plaintiffs' charter. If the consideration
in this respect fails, the agreement is of no value. But the conditions to be performed by the defendants must all be performed,
if the agreement is valid, before they could require the plaintiffs
to fulfil their covenants. It would be no answer to a prayer for
a specific performance, if it should appear the defendants were
unable or unwilling to comply with all or any of the stipulations
they had entered into. All are essential to the privilege imparted,
and no court would select any one from the whole, and reject the
rest. In this respect the contract may be said to be "in solido."
Other questions were argued at the bar, which we do not think
necessary now to decide; they were technical only, and did not
affect the real questions involved. On the whole case, we have
come to the conclusion the plaintiffs cannot recover upon the agreement they have submitted for our construction.
How far the issues of fact, which are yet to be tried, will be
affected by the decision we now make, will be left to the judge in
special term, who will be called on to try them.
The demurrer to the answer of the defendants will, therefore,
be overruled.
We cannot dismiss the case without tendering our thanks to all
the counsel, who so ably investigated and argued the questions
we have been called on to decide. They have greatly relieved
our labors, and enabled us more readily to arrive at the conclusions we have announced.
We can see no good ground to question the soundness of the foregoing opinion: but it seems to us, that the case
exhibits in a strong light, the embarrassments constantly resulting from having
railway corporations restrained in their
corporate functions to the limits of state
lines. It would certainly seem that there
is far more necessity and propriety in
having all the railway corporations in
the country possess a national character,
than there is in giving the same character to all the baa- of the country, which

has been already practically ef'ected, by
means of discriminating taxation. There
is every reason to regard railways as
national institutions, in almost every
sense, in which they possess a public
character, or perform public service, with
the single exception of intercommunication, which is mainly of local and state
concern.
1. As one of the wonderful advancements of military operations in modem
times, by which railways have wrought
a complete change in the conduct of war.
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and have become an indispensable necessity, they are entirely of a national
character, so much so as to exclude all
state control in times of war or civil
commotion.
2. In regard to postal communication,
which has been regarded as exclusively of
a national character, since the early and
palmy days of the Persian monarchy,
where public posts are said to have originated, railways must also be regarded as
an indispensable necessity. For if we
admit the right of state control over all,
or any considerable portion of the railways in the country, it will place all
postal communication at the mercy and
good will of state authority, which any
one must see is wholly inadmissible.
We have discussed the rights of rail-

way corporations in regard to acquiring
land and other prerogative rights in
adjoining states, without the action of the
legislature, in a case in Vermont, many
years since, when we came to the conclusion that no such prerogitivc rights
could be acquired out of the state of the
charter, except by legislative act: State
v. B. C. & Al. Railway, 21 Vt. R. 433.
This will not preclude such corporations
from acquiring the title of land out of
the state, by voluntary contract, or entering into any other contract, of the ordinary character of contracts between
natural persons ; but it will not justify
taking land compulsorily, or operating
a railway and taking tolls, &c.
I. F. R.
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HOFFMAN v. BECHTEL.
Where a creditor employs legal process against a debtor in the usual way and
without unnecessary.delay, it is prila*facieproof of such diligence in collecting his
debt as will give him a claim against a guarantor.
But this presumption may be overcome by proof that the creditor had special
knowledge of assets or opportunity of collecting his debt, and that his failure to
do so was the result of bad faith, or neglect to do what a prudent creditor who had
no other security but the debtor's obligation would have done under the circumstances.

THE opinion of the court was delivered by
STRONG, J.-The contract of guaranty is peculiar. Unlike
that of an ordinary surdty, it is collateral and secondary. The
creditor' must resort in the first instance to the debtor, and the
guarantor is liable only after the debtor has -proved insolvent,
and the creditor has used due diligence to obtain payment from
him unsuccessfully. But what is due diligence ? Perhaps it is
impossible to define it with any degree of certainty. It must
vary with the circumstances of each case, and hence it is a question for the jury: Rudy' v. Wolf, 16 S. & R. 79. It cannot be
less than such as a igilant creditor ordinarily employs to recover
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a debt for which he has no other surety than the obligation of the
debtor. The guarantor has certainly a right to expect an honest
and intelligent effort of the creditor to obtain payment from the
person primarily liable. Unless it be shown that legal process
would have been fruitless, it is the creditor's duty to employ that
process without unnecessary delay, and if he does, there is a
legal presumption that he has been duly diligent. This is all
that was decided in Kirkpatrick v. White, 5 Casey 176, and
Gilbert v. Jfenck, 6 Id. 205. But this presumption is not a conclusive one. There may be cases in which something more may
be due than simply suing out legal process, and letting it run its
course. This is intimated in both the cases last referred to. In
Kirkpatriek v. White, Judge LOWRIE said, due diligence does not
require the creditor to accompany the collecting officer and show
him personal property, unless he has some special knowledge
relating to it; and in Gilbert v. Henck the same judge said that
when the principal is not liable to a ca. sa., and the plaintiff has
issued a ft. fa., and it is returned "1nulla bona," he has done all
that the law requires of him in favor of the guarantor, unless
it be shown that the principal had property in some other county
that was known to the plaintiff, or ought to have been, and that
could be reached by ordinary execution process." Here is a
clear recognition of a duty resting upon the creditor holding z
guarantee of a third person, to do more in some cases than employ legal process against the debtor, and let it run its undisturbed course. He may often know that the debtor has tangible
property quite sufficient to satisfy the debt, which the sheriff,
without his aid, cannot discover. Surely, due diligence, in such
circumstances, requires him to do more than put an execution
into the hands of the officer of the law. No jury would doubt
that vigilant creditors would do more if they had no surety or
guarantor for the debt. It is not, then, to be taken as an universal rule that a creditor has done his whole duty to one who
had guaranteed the debt to him, when he has sued out legal process against the debtor, and placed it in the hands of the proper
officer. The most that can be claimed for it is, that it makes a
primd facie case of due diligence, which may be overcome by
proof of want of good faith in the creditor, and by proof that
the failure to recover from the debtor was in consequence of the
creditor's neglect to do what other prudent creditors, in like cir
'.
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cumstances, would ordinarily haye done: Brown v. Brooic, 1
Casey 210; Overton v. Tracy, 14 S. & R. 327.
These principles lead to the conclusion that the court below
fell into error in rejecting some of the evidence offered by the
defendant. The offer which we think should have been received
was evidence to prove that the debtor was the owner of a lot and
two houses thereon, worth two thousand five hundred dollars,
upon which the judgment entered on the bond, guaranteed by the
defendant, was a lien; that the lot was subject to prior incumbrances, amounting to about five hundred dollars; that under the
execution issued by the plaintiff-the lot was sold for seventy dollars to the wife of the debtor; that the plaintiff paid no attention
to the sale, absented himself from it; that after the sale was
made he came to the place, and remarked that he did not care, as
he was secured for his claim; that he made no effort to have the
sale set aside, and a resale ordered, and that he privately offered
to the purchaser an advance on his bid if the purchaser would
transfer the bid to him. We must of course now assume that all
this could have been proved, and that it would have been had the
court allowed the evidence to be given. The question to be
answered then is, would it have tended to show want of good
faith to the guarantor, or failure to use that diligence in collecting the debt from Henninger, the debtor, which prudent creditors
ordinarily exert in collecting debts due to them ? We think it
would, and that it should have been submitted to the jury for
them to find whether it was sufficient to overcome the primdfacie
case made out by the plaintiff. We do not assert that it is the
duty of a creditor, to whom a guaranty has been given, to attend
the sheriff's sale of his debtor's property, and there bid upon it.
Generally it is not. But there is much more in this case. All
the facts are to be considered, and considered as bearing upon
each other. The declaration of the plaintiff; the private offer
to take the bid ; the fact that the wife of the defendant was the
purchaser; that the property sold for less than one-twentieth of
its value, and that the plaintiff refused to apply to the court to
set aside the sheriff's sale, all are more or less significant. It
must be left to a jury to say whether they show that the plaintiff
failed to use with good faith that diligence in collecting the debt
from Henninger which prudent creditors ordinarily employ. If
they do show that, they will avail for the defendant.

